Three underestimated aspects and their consequences from the perspective of open youth work
Sertan Batur
Preliminary remark by perspek’tif:a: There is also debate in Austria about how to deal with the Grey Wolves. Several days of riots in the Favoriten district of Vienna in June 2020 sparked particular debate. A rally by Kurdish-Turkish activists was disrupted at that time by people who apparently identified with the Grey Wolves. Later, the Ernst-Kirchweger-Haus, a building formerly occupied by squatters and now home to left-wing Kurdish and Turkish organizations, was attacked. How should the involvement of many young people in these right-wing extremist attacks be assessed, and how should youth organizations respond? In the following, we compare two perspectives from Vienna. Youth worker and psychologist Sertan Batur argues that identification with the Grey Wolves should not be equated with complete support for their ideology and organized structures. Instead, he says, we must take into account the identity-forming effect, personal experiences of racism, and aspects of youth culture that can lead young people to develop a corresponding identity. Consequently, he advocates an interested, position-related, open, needs-oriented, relationship-building, and supportive attitude toward young people. In his article, “The Grey Wolves and the Question of Identity,” journalist and social worker Michael Bonvalot warns against trivializing political self-descriptions and repeating the mistakes made when accepting youth work in Germany in the 1990s. Instead, social work should address perpetrators directly and work through their actions with them without losing sight of those affected.
In June 2020, a Kurdish rally in the 10th district of Vienna, Favoriten, was attacked by Turkish nationalists. When the organisers of the rally sought refuge in the premises of a left-wing association located in the former squat of the Ernst-Kirchweger-Haus, hundreds of attackers quickly gathered outside the building. They smashed the building’s windows and attempted to set it on fire. Demonstrations, counter-demonstrations and police operations continued for three days, resulting in several arrests and vandalised cars, as well as heavy criticism of the police from all sides. [1] These events sparked discussions in the media and Austrian politics about migrants in Austria. On its Facebook page, the Turkish Federation in Austria (Avusturya Türk Federasyon), which is supported by the Turkish far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), distanced itself from the riots and called on everyone to respect Austrian law. Nevertheless, Austrian media and politicians classified the attack as an action by the Grey Wolves. Several participants clearly identified with the Grey Wolves or their symbols, carrying Turkish flags and making the banned wolf salute, while shouting “Allahu ekber”.
Part of the discussion focused on the possibility of direct influence from Turkey, where the MHP — the Grey Wolves’ party — is a junior partner in the government, alongside the senior partner, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is increasingly integrating Turkish nationalism into its own policies. .[2]It is well known that some members of the Turkish ruling parties and high-ranking Turkish bureaucrats have links to right-wing extremist and criminal organisations in Europe, such as Osmanen Germania. .[3] Such groups intimidate opposition intellectuals and journalists [4] and act as henchmen of the Turkish ‘deep state’ within the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in Europe.
However, such connections do not explain why nationalist ideology exerts such a strong influence within the diaspora, enabling hundreds of young people aged 13–21 to be mobilised via social networks within hours in a European capital. Portraying these young people as part of a tightly organised fascist organisation controlled from Turkey does not correspond to reality. Such simplistic explanations obscure the fact that this is not only a political issue, but a social one too.
This blog post is based on my own experiences as a youth worker with these young people, as well as interviews with participants in the riots conducted for a bachelor’s thesis [5] and the experiences of a video project created with the young people’s participation in the same context [6] . Three aspects of nationalist ideologies are summarised in this article, and the preventive work of youth social work in relation to these aspects is discussed. Although these experiences were gathered in Austria, the phenomenon discussed here is by no means unique to Austria; it also affects German cities where the Turkish diaspora exhibits similar characteristics.
Imaginary power
Firstly, it should be noted that nationalist tendencies are not only an issue among Turkish youth in the diaspora. If you look through the Instagram accounts of young people of migrant background, you will often find self-descriptions such as ‘proud Turk’, ‘proud Arab’, ‘proud Muslim’, ‘proud Alba nian’, ‘proud Kurd’, and so on, in their bios. It is no secret that right-wing populist parties in Europe enjoy strong support among young people in some regions. .[7] A detailed sociological analysis of the reasons for the success of right-wing ideologies among young people would go beyond the scope of this blog post. However, examining young people with Turkish nationalist tendencies can provide insight into the social context of Turkish nationalism in the diaspora.
As children of migrant families, these young people are significantly more affected by unemployment and poverty than native young people.[8] They are directly affected by institutionalized and structural racism and segregation in schools .[9] Coming from traditional working-class families, they are usually unable to acquire the social skills required in the neoliberal economic order. This applies both at home and at school, where they are at a disadvantage due to segregation. They are largely influenced by traditional gender roles, which further marginalises them in neoliberal society. They also experience strong everyday racism in political and media discussions. A lack of interest in the politics of their own country is often a sign of exclusion from local politics and a lack of opportunities for participation. Nationalist ideologies offer young people imaginary opportunities for action and spheres of power precisely where they find no opportunities for action, feel powerless and are overwhelmed by majority society. Benedict Anderson aptly describes the opportunities that this ‘long-distance nationalism’ provides:
“The more a diaspora group feels excluded, ignored, overlooked, and discriminated against, the more it tends to turn to the politics of its home country—especially when that country is in trouble. Then people start sending messages on the internet, spreading propaganda, sending money, maybe even buying weapons. In rich Western countries, people can do many things that enable them to exert real influence on events in their homeland. There are many diaspora communities whose home countries are in great difficulty and torn apart by internal politics. But the prerequisite for exerting influence is that these people can imagine themselves as heroes, sometimes even heroines. They fight for their country and for liberation on the internet rather than on the battlefield. And that is a completely different experience.” [10]
It is important here to distinguish between racism in the majority society and ‘distant nationalism’ in the diaspora group. In current forms of racism in Western and Northern Europe, the primary issue is that one’s ‘own’ national identity is abstract and characterised by conformity with existing values and power relations [11] .These power relations are secured by the intervention of the nation state and are legal realities, not mere constructs. Distant nationalism, on the other hand, does not demand conformity with the existing conditions in the nation state in which the diaspora group lives. Instead, it offers an ‘imaginary’ power in the country of origin of the parents or grandparents. However, people in the diaspora often experience discrimination in their home country as well. Nationalist ideology accepts them as they are, in contrast to neoliberal society, which regards them as expendable labour and requires them to acquire new social skills and develop ‘acceptable’ ways of dealing with their experiences of discrimination, in order to find a legitimate place in society. Nationalist ideology, on the other hand, idealises their traditional concepts of life, gender roles, and their response to discrimination on ethnic and social grounds. Thus, nationalism offers the idea that the discriminated group gains power not only over other ethnic groups in their home country, but also over the majority society in the country where they live. Nationalist ideologies often equate oppressed groups in their ‘home country’ with oppressors in Europe, creating the illusion of opposition to colonialism, imperialism and racism [12] . The idea of being ‘actually’ better or morally superior, and of returning to a ‘golden age’ when one’s own group ruled over all others, replaces the possibility of taking action against oppression, which seems impossible or too dangerous. This is why nationalist ideologies among migrants must be considered alongside their current oppression and power relations. Racism in the majority society and the distant nationalism of the diaspora group are two sides of the same coin.
This imagined power is extremely useful to the governments of the home countries, who constantly cultivate it. While local media pay little attention to migrants, pro-government media in home countries try to engage with diaspora groups through special programmes and content. This gives governments the opportunity to influence and mobilise the diaspora politically, which they primarily see as an important financial source.
Identity formation
Another important aspect is the role of nationalism in forming identity. In this context, social and developmental psychological aspects should both be considered. Discrimination on ethnic grounds and nationalist ideology reinforce each other and strongly impact the identity formation of young people in the diaspora.
In Pamina Gutschelhofer’s bachelor thesis, a young person explains his desire not to be considered part of a discriminated group as follows:
‘Well, it’s… with us, I mean, we have a lot of Turks who have complexes about things like that. For example, when people say, ‘Yeah, you’re just a fucking Turk.’ The one who… I get upset when people say that, not because I really am a ‘fucking Turk’, but because I don’t see myself as a Turk; I see myself more as an Ottoman.” [13]
Gutschelhofer attributes this desire to be referred to as Ottoman to the wish “to no longer be in a subordinate role, but to take on the role of the dominant”. [14]
These ideas about one’s identity also have an everyday function. Constant discrimination can lead young people to create social niches where they are not subjected to racial discrimination. Nationalist ideology plays a certain unifying role here. As long as the group shares the same nationalist ideology, its members can be sure that they are dealing with their peers and do not have to explain or justify themselves to outsiders. In an interview, young people involved in the “Lasst Brüder nicht Kämpfen” (Don’t Let Brothers Fight) video project, who have since distanced themselves from the Grey Wolves, explain the role of nationalist ideology in group formation.
“At 13, everyone was a Bozkurt,” says Cengiz, referring to the Turkish word for “Grey Wolf.” “But you have no idea what that means,” he adds. For him, it simply meant being Turkish. “When I met someone who was also a Bozkurt, it just meant: We’re a match. One word, and you were friends,” says Cengiz. The other two boys nod as he says this. “Now we know how wrong that is.” “We all had older Abis [15] who enlightened us at some point,” says Atilla. “Only children support the Bozkurt. Too much national pride isn’t good either.””(16)
In everyday youth work conversations, young people who identify with the Grey Wolves and wear right-wing extremist symbols often have little information about the Grey Wolves or the MHP. They use the term “Grey Wolf” as a synonym for “proud Turk.” In these cases, the name and symbolism serve to form an identity or group.
Youth cultural aspects
A third important point is the youth cultural aspect. Right-wing ideology often appeals to young people. A young person from Favoriten explains why he got involved:
“I was bored,” Cengiz recalls of June 25, when he received a message on his cell phone. “A Kurd pulled down a sister’s headscarf. Come on, everyone, let’s go.” I thought to myself: Sounds good. Action. I’m in,” says Cengiz. For the 17-year-old, it sounded like fun [17].Many participants still do not know what the actual reason for the riots in Favoriten was.[18] Young people heard various rumors on social media and spontaneously decided to go there. In addition to the fun factor, group affiliation also plays an important role here. Not letting friends down[19] and saving face in front of their friends [20] are often cited by young people as reasons for their participation in the riots. Youth cultural factors also explain why the attackers in the riots in Favoriten were not only Turkish youths, but a mixture of youths from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Turks, Afghans, Chechens, Bulgarians, Pakistanis, etc.
Preventive work
The three aspects of nationalist ideologies—imaginary power against oppression, the group-forming function, and youth cultural aspects—play an important role in preventive work. Young people can identify with the Grey Wolves and their symbols based on these aspects, even if they don’t participate in an organized structure or know the Grey Wolves’ ideology and background in detail. Right-wing groups and organizations of the Turkish “deep state” recruit these young people because they are willing to manipulate and use violence as supposed heroes. However, not all young people who identify with the Grey Wolves or their symbols are equally organized and ideologized fascists.
In preventive work, it is important to reflect with young people on the imagined possibilities offered by nationalist ideologies. Ideally, these possibilities should be replaced by real ones. It is crucial to take young people’s experiences of discrimination seriously and create non-discriminatory spaces where these experiences and potential strategies can be discussed together. An important aspect of prevention work is accepting everyday, structural, and institutionalized racism as social realities. The focus should be on the behavior of the national state and its legal interventions rather than on those who are discriminated against. Clearly siding with the oppressed not only strengthens their capacity to act, but also serves as a role model.
However, preventive work should not create new power relations between adult native youth workers and migrant adolescents. Rather, it should be oriented toward the interests and needs of young people, taking place on an equal footing. Rather than taking on an “educational” position of power, youth work should take on a supportive role based on solidarity. This enables the exchange of experiences among young people and between young people and adult youth workers.
Discussing identity-forming processes and reinterpreting nationalist narratives are important parts of preventive work in this context. The problem is not that a group of young people define themselves as Turkish because this definition is largely imposed from outside. Rather, the problem is that they construct their Turkishness through discrimination against other groups. Reframing opens up opportunities to preserve group identity without adopting nationalist narratives. For instance, one does not need to identify with the Young Turks who massacred Armenians in 1915 to be a proud Turk. One can be proud to be Turkish by identifying with Turks who opposed Young Turk policies and showed solidarity with Armenian civilians.
Aspects of youth culture are also addressed in preventive work. It is important to take the fun factor seriously and approach the topic with humor [22]. It is also important to make other fun opportunities accessible to young people. Additionally, maintaining a constant dialogue with young people and staying informed about current youth culture is important. Important components of preventive work include following current trends in music, media, and social networks; exchanging ideas with young people about these trends; and discussing friendship styles, as well as relationship and life concepts, with young people. It is also important to challenge nationalist and patriarchal narratives and support young people in developing their own life and friendship concepts that align with their interests.
The most important foundation of preventive work is having an interested, open, supportive, and needs-oriented attitude, as well as building relationships. However, it would be counterproductive for preventive work to jump to conclusions without first understanding the reasons behind young people’s actions.
—
Sertan Batur is a youth worker and trained clinical and health psychologist. He also lectures on various topics related to youth work, violence prevention, racism, Grey Wolves, and critical work with boys and men. He runs a youth club in Vienna’s Floridsdorf district.
[1] https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000118302002/erneut-angriff-grauer-woelfe-auf-kurdische-demo-in-wien
[2] https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000118369179/demos-in-wien-favoriten-was-steckt-dahinter-wer-ist-involviert
[3] https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/osmanen-germania-portraet-1.4047892
[4] https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000128045803/tuerkischer-journalist-erk-acarer-in-berlin-angegriffen
[5] Pamina Gutschelhofer (2021). Von Grauen Wölfen und kurdischen Flaggen: Warum Jugendliche im Juni 2020 Favoriten in Aufruhr versetzt haben. Unpublished bachelor’s thesis, St. Pölten University of Applied Sciences.
[6] The video project “Lasst Brüder nicht Kämpfen” (Don’t let brothers fight) can be viewed on YouTube on the Bro&Kontra channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdxfM8JZD80zfJhq83CAHeQ
[7] E.g.: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/landtagswahl-sachsen-anhalt-warum-so-viele-junge-menschen-100.html
[8] https://mediendienst-integration.de/integration/arbeitsmarkt.html
[9] https://www.svr-migration.de/publikationen/segregation-an-deutschen-schulen-ausmass-folgen-und-handlungsempfehlungen-fuer-bessere-bildungschancen/
[10] Benedict Anderson (2012). Mutationen des Nationalismus. In Isolde Charim & Gertraud Auer Borea (Hg.). Lebensmodell Diaspora (35-42). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 41f.
[11] Sertan Batur (2021). Sertan Batur (2021). Rassismus und Soziale Arbeit. In ogsa AG Migrationsgesellschaft (Hg.). Soziale Arbeit in der Postmigrationsgesellschaft: Kritische Perspektiven und Praxisbeispiele aus Österreich (52-65). Basel: Beltz Juventa, 57.
[12] For example, newspapers close to the government in Turkey often claim that the Kurdish question is being stirred up by European politicians and that Kurdish organizations enjoy the support and protection of European or North American governments.
[13] Pamina Gutschelhofer (2021). Von Grauen Wölfen und kurdischen Flaggen: Warum Jugendliche im Juni 2020 Favoriten in Aufruhr versetzt haben. Unpublished bachelor’s thesis, St. Pölten University of Applied Sciences, 23.
[14] Ibid., 24.
[15] The word “Abi” is the colloquial form of the word Ağabey, which means older brother.
[16] https://theworldnews.net/at-news/wie-die-krawalle-in-favoriten-aufgearbeitet-werden
[17] https://theworldnews.net/at-news/wie-die-krawalle-in-favoriten-aufgearbeitet-werden
[18] Ibid.
[19] Gutschelhofer, 24.
[20] https://theworldnews.net/at-news/wie-die-krawalle-in-favoriten-aufgearbeitet-werden
[21] Gutschelhofer, 21.
[22] For example, stereotypes and clichés can be reduced to absurdity, one’s own identities can be ridiculed, etc.
The publications do not represent the opinions of the BMFSFJ, the BAFzA, or the social welfare authorities. The author(s) are responsible for the content of the publications.