How Turkish nationalists in Vienna attacked Kurdish and Turkish leftists for days—and why social workers must not downplay this.
Michael Bonvalot
There is also debate in Austria about how to deal with the Grey Wolves. Several days of riots in the Favoriten district of Vienna in June 2020 sparked particular debate. A rally by Kurdish-Turkish activists was disrupted at that time by people who apparently identified with the Grey Wolves. Later, the Ernst-Kirchweger-Haus, a building formerly occupied by squatters and now home to left-wing Kurdish and Turkish organizations, was attacked. How should the involvement of many young people in these right-wing extremist attacks be assessed, and how should youth organizations respond? In the following, we compare two perspectives from Vienna. Youth worker and psychologist Sertan Batur argues that identification with the Grey Wolves should not be equated with complete support for their ideology and organized structures. Instead, he says, we must take into account the identity-forming effect, personal experiences of racism, and aspects of youth culture that can lead young people to develop a corresponding identity. Consequently, he advocates an interested, position-related, open, needs-oriented, relationship-building, and supportive attitude toward young people. In his article, “The Grey Wolves and the Question of Identity,” journalist and social worker Michael Bonvalot warns against trivializing political self-descriptions and repeating the mistakes made when accepting youth work in Germany in the 1990s. Instead, social work should address perpetrators directly and work through their actions with them without losing sight of those affected.
Suddenly, glass shatters. It is June 25, 2020. At least a hundred supporters of the fascist Grey Wolves and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP party attack the left-wing cultural center EKH in Vienna’s Favoriten district. They attempt to break into the building, throwing bottles and other objects and smashing windows in the process. I arrive at the scene shortly after the attack. Wielandgasse in front of the EKH is littered with glass shards.
Pictures and videos show the attackers gathering in a nearby park shortly before the attack. Almost all of them have their hands raised, either giving the Grey Wolves salute or the Rabia salute of the Muslim Brotherhood. They are also making the gesture of raising an index finger, which is used by the terrorist organization IS. Many of the attackers are young, some even very young. However, many adult men can also be seen in the pictures.
The Grey Wolves are the common name for the fascist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Their death squads are responsible for several thousand political murders, and they are considered a key global player in organized crime, particularly drug trafficking. Currently, the Wolves are in power with the AKP in the Turkish government.
The target of the far-right attackers was not chosen at random. “EKH” stands for Ernst-Kirchweger-Haus, named after a communist and resistance fighter. Above all, two left-wing Turkish and Kurdish organizations are based there: the ATIGF (Federation of Turkish Workers and Youth in Austria) and the DIDF (Federation of Democratic Turkish Associations). This is well known among politically engaged Turks and Kurds.
“They threatened us with knives”
On June 24, the day before the major attack, left-wing Kurdish and Turkish women’s organizations organized a rally on Favoritenstraße, the main street of the district. The first attacks had already occurred that day, setting in motion the events that followed. “They threatened us with knives,” a left-wing activist told me that evening. “We’ll kill you,” the fascists had declared.
Although also women are in extreme right wing movements, there are no women among the attackers that night, at least none that can be identified.
“It was a veritable siege,” said another Kurdish activist. After the leftists retreated to their club rooms in the EKH, the attacks on the building began. The Viennese left mobilized and quickly gathered many supporters in front of the building, causing the fascists to retreat for the time being.
The next day, June 25, 2020, a left-wing solidarity demonstration with several hundred people took place on Favoritenstraße. At that very moment, a message spread on social media, reaching many young people in particular. A Kurdish man had allegedly pulled the headscarf off a “sister.” The call to action read: “Come to Reumann.” Reumannplatz is the district’s main square—right on Favoritenstraße and only a few minutes’ walk from the EKH.
Later, no evidence will be found to support the headscarf claim. It is also unclear who started the rumor first. However, it is clear who the target of the attacks is supposed to be: “The Kurds.” It is also clear where the attacks are supposed to concentrate. Now, “everyone” is supposed to come to the vicinity of the left-wing rally. Very quickly, around a hundred supporters of the Grey Wolves and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gathered on Favoritenstraße in response to the call. After the leftists initially disperse the fascist mob, the right-wingers regroup. In the evening, the attack on the EKH begins.
Nationally liberated zone
This is not the first attack on a left-wing, Kurdish-Turkish rally in Favoriten. Just two months earlier, on May 1, 2020, Turkish nationalists attacked a joint May Day rally of left-wing organizations in this traditional working-class district. At that time, left-wing Kurdish and Turkish activists warned that Turkish nationalists in Favoriten, where many people of Turkish and Kurdish descent live, would try to establish a “nationally liberated zone.”
After the attack on the EKH, clashes continued for several days. Young nationalists were repeatedly involved, but older men were also present. The following Saturday a leftist protest took place. For the first time since the riots had started, there were no attacks by larger groups against the left-wing demonstration that Saturday. This was because something decisive had happened in the meantime:
The fascist organizations can control the protests
On the previous day, four prominent nationalist players disseminated congruent messages via Facebook, urging an immediate cessation to further hostilities. These individuals included the Austrian umbrella organization ATF (Turkish Federation in Austria), the ATF Youth, the ATF splinter group BBP (Great Unity Party), and the BBP’s Vakıf Mosque in Favoriten. In addition to operating a mosque, the BBP, an organization with religious fascist leanings, manages a youth club in the area known as “Alperen Ocaklari.” Alperen Ocakları translates to “heroes’ hearth,” a term employed by the BBP fascists to reference their centers. This term is in contrast to the “Ülkü Ocakları,” the “idealists’ hearths” of the MHP.
Prior to Friday’s statement, these actors had maintained a period of silence that extended for several days. The pivotal element in this matter is not the fact that the fascists voiced their opinions; rather, it is the timing of their actions, which occurred only after a sustained period of mounting media and public pressure, and only after the attacks had persisted for several days.
How organized were the protests?
Even if we assume that the initial attacks and the subsequent social media call after the alleged headscarf attack were unorganized, the mobilization for the EKH attack was clearly and unambiguously organized.
While we cannot prove who initiated the attacks, we can show that the Grey Wolves and their splinter group, the BBP, were able to end the mobilization with a single instruction. However, we can prove that the Grey Wolves and the BBP could end the mobilization with a single instruction. Little makes the organized nature of the attacks clearer.
For example, a Twitter user reported that a large group of Grey Wolves were on a train bound for Vienna when he boarded in Linz. Some of them spoke with a German accent. The timing of the attacks is probably no coincidence. In the weeks leading up to them, the Turkish government greatly escalated its fight against the left-wing Kurdish PKK in northern Iraq. Nationalistic images of the war were broadcast via satellite television and social media from Turkey to the diaspora. Apparently, it was time to take action in Austria as well.
Puppies and wolves
It is evident that not all of the young people who participated in the fascist aggression were political cadres. It is not reasonable to assume that all of these young people have a firmly established political worldview.
For some of the young people, the provocations seemed like an enjoyable change from everyday life, a game of cat and mouse with leftists and the police. In addition to Turkish youths, religiously motivated youths from other predominantly Muslim countries were also involved.
Moreover, it is imperative to recognize that law enforcement is frequently regarded with skepticism, particularly among young people with a migration background. This perception can be attributed to a variety of understandable factors. The pervasive nature of racism is deeply entrenched, manifesting in experiences that span generations and encompass various facets of life. This suggests that encounters with law enforcement are frequently characterized by a sense of excitement and a positive emotional charge.
However, these observations should not be interpreted as a justification for the relativization of the political self-attributions of the individuals involved. There is a predominant consensus that individuals’ political convictions, whether they align with leftist ideologies or right-wing perspectives, are not subject to debate or denial. However, a curious phenomenon emerges when examining the actions of certain representatives who claim to represent “accepting youth.” These individuals, typically affiliated with leftist or progressive factions, endeavor to disavow or contest the political convictions of young individuals who align with right-wing ideologies. It is evident that young people, in particular, often lack the capacity to present their political convictions in a rigorous manner based on party programs. However, it is probable that not all voluntary members of the Hitler Youth possessed the ability to recite the entirety of the NSDAP party program. Nevertheless, this does not mitigate the threat posed by fascist forces. Consequently, the responsibility of social and youth workers cannot be to mitigate the fascist political inclinations of their clients. Instead, the objective should be to confront them and, ideally, to effect change.
The issue does not originate with overt fascism, but rather with earlier forms of social and political ideology, such as national pride. This approach is most effective when the aspects that hinder pride are minimized. The road to denying or trivializing genocide is a short one—as evidenced by the actions of the German and Austrian extreme right. For this reason, youth work should prioritize an internationalist perspective of class solidarity and shared experiences of oppression over national pride.
All brothers?
In response to the riots in Favoriten, the video project “Lasst Brüder nicht kämpfen” (Don’t let brothers fight[1]. was created. The account is presented from the perspective of the perpetrator, who stated, “You strike first, my friend said to me.” The protagonist’s thoughts turn to his mother, who would disapprove. The protagonist also expressed concern that he might be “stabbed.” (It should be noted that knives were only drawn by Turkish nationalists on those days; I personally witnessed a young man with a knife in his hand.) Anyhow, the protagonist and several acquaintances assault an unknown individual — perhaps he is the person who forcibly removed the woman’s headscarf? The reasons behind the youth’s beliefs in this matter are not yet fully understood. Did the young man have political symbols on his clothing, or perhaps he was simply speaking Kurdish? We have not yet ascertained the outcome.The assailants proceeded to physically assault the young man. However, while he is being beaten repeatedly, the victim in the video pulls his mask off his head. “I was shocked. The Kurd was one of my oldest friends,” says the protagonist. Cut. The perpetrator and victim then embrace. Finally, the moral of the story is that in our social circle, there is no distinction between Kurds and Turks. We are all brothers.”
Let’s continue with the example from the video. What would have happened if the perpetrator and the victim did not know each other? The perpetrator would not have had to question his Turkish nationalist views or his willingness to beat up another young person. Of course, the message at the end is positive. However, it all falls a little short.
Anyone who has worked with Turkish and Kurdish youth knows that the idea that Kurds and Turks are indistinguishable among friends is more wishful thinking than reality. It’s true that origin often has relatively little significance in everyday life. Everyone lives in the same city, speaks Turkish, and Kurds often don’t mention their ethnicity. However, this usually only works until Kurdish young people stop hiding and start using the Kurdish language or talking about the situation of Kurds in Turkey. Then, the brotherhood on the part of Turkish nationalist youth usually ends very quickly.
“The Turks” and “the Kurds”?
Furthermore, the video never questions the supposed distinction between “the Kurds” and “the Turks.” On the contrary, it reinforces this distinction. But in fact, the central issue here is a political conflict. The clashes in Vienna involved left-wing Kurds, Turks, and Austrians on one side. And it would come as no surprise if the other side had included not only nationalist Turks, but also supporters of Hüda Par, a successor organization to the religious-fascist murderers of the Kurdish Hezbollah.
If the video project has succeeded in actually making individual nationalist youths think, then it has undoubtedly fulfilled its purpose. However, it is questionable whether this video can actually contribute to challenging fundamental narratives.
The nationalism of the oppressed
Youth work and academia are familiar with the phenomenon of long distance nationalism – the imagination of a distant and proud fatherland as a positive counterpart to the humiliating experiences of everyday life. However, long-distance nationalism alone emphasizes the victim perspective of nationalist clients above all else. Other influences also play a role for people and groups who experience racism. Specifically: Turkish migration to Vienna often originated in the Yozgat region, a traditional stronghold of the Turkish nationalist right. Of course, those who immigrated to Austria did not leave their political values at the border. We know that fundamental values are often passed down through generations.
In my social work practice, I have hardly ever encountered such open racism against black people as in conversations with Turkish nationalist youths. What was particularly striking was that these young people had previously been either racially discriminated against or addressed as victims of racial discrimination. No one had ever confronted them with their own racist ideas.
The educational discourse also falls short. In school, Nazi concentration camps are discussed, and ideally, current racism is addressed in this context as well. However, for young people with a migration background, this topic often seems irrelevant or only relevant to them as victims. On the other hand, modern education and social work need pedagogical approaches to address racist prejudices and right-wing extremism among people with a migration background.
Taking a closer look
Often, youth workers have only a very superficial understanding of how migrant communities are organized. For example, they may know that their young people regularly pray in a mosque. However, they often have no idea that Turkish mosques in Austria are almost always affiliated with political organizations and movements.
As a result, youth workers are usually completely unaware of the political influence on the young people they work with. They are unfamiliar with relevant symbols and key ideological terms. Consequently, they naively report that the young people are not affiliated with any political organization. Finally, the enormous ideological influence of the Turkish nationalist media landscape should not be underestimated.
The fatal approach of accepting youth work
The social work approach known as Accepting Youth Work originated in the treatment of drug addiction. It involves seeing the person and not just the illness and accepting those who are not (yet) able or willing to break free from their addiction as clients. It’s a clever and understandable approach.
However, in Germany, this approach became the social work model for working with the extreme right from the early 1990s onward, in response to neo-Nazi arson attacks and murders. This translated “accepting youth work” into a political sphere, where it was fatal: neo-Nazis were suddenly provided state facilities, financial resources, and human resources to build their structures further. In short, the idea was that if Nazis had jobs, places to live, and leisure resources, the problem would solve itself.
The perpetrators were rewarded once again and would have faced disadvantages if they had removed themselves from their social and political contexts. This is because they would no longer have been the target group for social work support. Conversely, victims of racist and neo-Nazi violence were punished and marginalized by allocating resources and spaces primarily to the perpetrators. The approach failed miserably.
A notable case illustrates the consequences of providing such spaces: the infamous neo-Nazi group “Thüringer Heimatschutz” (THS) established its first contact point in a district and youth center in Saalfeld. The THS later founded the terrorist organization NSU (National Socialist Underground).
Confronting the perpetrators with their respective biographies.
Even back then, many warned that treating youth as perpetrators was a problematic approach to addressing a political problem. In 2000, I wrote my thesis as a critique of these developments. And presently, this strategy is equally troublesome with regard to Turkish nationalist young people.
Of course, youth services should not turn away clients who may have been involved in the Favoriten attacks. However, the situation is different for cadres, who should not be given resources or opportunities to recruit others. I no longer work full-time as a social worker, but I still work as a volunteer probation officer. In this role, there’s one important principle that guides my work: individuals who have committed a crime are addressed as perpetrators. Their actions are addressed with them, and they are confronted with the perspective of the victims. The objective here is to prevent puppies from transforming into wolves.
Putting those affected at the center
First and foremost, social work identifies those affected and their needs. If it fails to do so and focuses only on the perpetrators, it rewards the perpetrators with more resources and punishes the victims a second time.
An essential element of social work is showing partiality to the weakest members of society. In this case, however, the clearly oppressed are people from the Kurdish minority and the Turkish and Kurdish left. They should be the recipients of solidarity and support. Their projects and needs should be at the center of social work and receive the necessary resources.
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Michael Bonvalot is a journalist, author, lecturer, and social worker in Vienna. He publishes his articles in various media outlets in Austria and Germany, on his website standpunkt.press , and via his social media channels on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram.
His main areas of interest are the extreme right and social movements. He has been studying the Grey Wolves for years and has published numerous articles on his website standpunkt.press , including a series on the history, political positions, symbols, and organization of the Wolves.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tkmt-dwXpWY
The publications do not represent the opinions of the BMFSFJ, the BAFzA, or the social welfare authorities. The author(s) are responsible for the content of the publications.